Most jurisdictions in the U.S. award pain and suffering damages to spouses of victims in wrongful death cases. In several East Asian countries, spouses, parents, and children can all demand compensation for loss of consortium. Despite the prevalence of this type of damages, and the oft-enormous amount of compensation, there has been no large-scale empirical study on how judges achieve the difficult task of converting sorrow to money. Using a unique dataset containing hundreds of car accident cases rendered by the court of first instance in Taiwan in single-equation and structural-equation models, we find the plaintiffs' ad damnum have a statistically significant influence on the court-adjudicated pain and suffering damages. That is, a strong anchor effect exists. Nevertheless, courts are very sensitive to the possibility of bankrupting defendants. When defendants' out-of-pocket payments of pecuniary damages, divided by defendants' income, are positive, this amount has a negative effect on the amount of pain and suffering damages, whereas when they are negative, the amount in absolute value has a positive effect. Not all next of kin receive the same amount. Spouses of the victim receive more than other next of kin, and adult children receive the least among eligible relatives. Parents, however, tend to be awarded high amount of pain and suffering damages when they are the only familial group suing the defendant.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pain and suffering and other noneconomic damages awarded by courts have generated much normative and policy debate in the U.S. (see, e.g., Croley and Hanson 1995; Geistfeld 1995; McCaffery, Kahneman, and Spitzer 1995; Vidmar, Gross, and Rose 1998; Niemeyer 2004; Geistfeld 2005; Rabin 2005; Sharkey 2005; Avraham 2006; Sugarman 2006; Viscusi 2007) and elsewhere (Karapanou and Visscher 2010; Flatscher-Thöni, Leiter, and Winner 2013, 2014) . While in wrongful death cases, most states in the United States award spouses of the dead victim with pain and suffering damages for loss of spousal consortium, and a minority of states allow pain and suffering damages for loss of parental consortium (Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein 1988: 912; Epstein 1999: 451-453; Shapo 2010: 486-487) , all existing empirical and experimental studies on pain and suffering damages focus on personal injury cases. 1 Therefore, empirical knowledge regarding how judges or juries quantify the pain of losing a beloved family member is lacking. This article fills in the gap by empirically examining a unique dataset from Taiwan that contains information on pain and suffering compensation for loss of parental, spousal, and child consortium, pecuniary damages, plaintiffs' and defendants' annual income, among others.
It is important to ascertain whether pain and suffering damages in wrongful death cases follow any rational pattern. Eric A. Posner and Sunstein (2005: 543) states that " [t] here is every reason to believe that the resulting awards [damages for pain and suffering for the distress and loss of companionship suffered by dependents or heirs of the dead tort victims] have a high degree of arbitrariness" (emphasis added). Even Judge Posner (2011: 319) , who generally believes in the efficiency of the common law, lists "the method of computing damages in death cases" as one of the four common law doctrines that may not have a sound economic rationale. Moreover, noneconomic damages are a substantial fraction of all damages (Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein 1988; Viscusi 1988: 207-08; Avraham 2006) . Lack of a rational basis for them would call into question about half or more of tort damages. Pain and suffering damages also are an instance of unbounded damages, which generate positively skewed award distributions (Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein 1998; Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich 2000) , which in turn lead to reform proposals (e.g., Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein 1998) . In Chang et al. (2014) , using another unique dataset from Taiwan regarding the pain and suffering compensation in personal injury cases, we find that career judges in Taiwan 1 For experimental studies on pain and suffering damages in personal injury cases, see Chapman and Bornstein (1996) , McCaffery, Kahneman, and Spitzer (1995) , Avraham (2005) , and Diamond, Saks, and Landsman (1998) . Empirical studies on pain and suffering damages in personal injury cases do not always include death cases (Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein 1988; Viscusi 1988; Vidmar, Gross, and Rose 1998; Sharkey 2005; Sugarman 2006; Kritzer, Liu, and Vidmar 2014) . The studies (e.g. Leebron 1989 ) that include death cases analyze compensation for pain and suffering between the time of injury and the time of death, not compensation for survivors.
reasonably base much of their difficult decisions on objective criteria, most notably the amount of medical costs and the level of injury. Compared with awarding pain and suffering compensation for loss of consortium, ascertaining that amount for personal injury seems easy. In wrongful death cases, often no pecuniary damages (except funeral expenses) can be claimed, 2 and pecuniary damages are at most indirectly related to the emotional distress of the plaintiffs, as the killed person (or her estate) is not the suing party. Judicial decision-makers are left with the personal characteristics of the two parties and the dead victim. It is thus interesting to examine whether in such situations pain and suffering damages for loss of consortium can be consistent or systematically correlated with certain facets of the cases.
From a comparative viewpoint, whether mourning over the deceased by the next kin can be compensated appears to exhibit cultural differences. In a survey of tort laws in ten European countries, it is found that except in the shocking cases, spouses and other relatives are not entitled to claim pain and suffering compensation (Koch and Koziol 2003: 429-30) . By contrast, in East Asian countries, such as Taiwan, 3 China, 4 Japan, 5 and South Korea, 6 spouses, parents, and children of victims have explicitly recognized rights of demanding compensation for loss of consortium. In the world-spectrum of pain and suffering damages, the U.S. is in the middle, as at least spouses are entitled to this kind of nonpecuniary compensation. The findings of this empirical inquiry could shed light on how judicial decisionmakers in the U.S. and other East Asian countries may have (or would have 7 ) quantified the emotional distress of close relatives.
Using randomly sampled car-accident cases from Taiwan, we provide three analyses of pain and suffering damages. First, we assess the effects of personal information of the two parties and the victim on requested and awarded pain and suffering damages. We find that high-income plaintiffs request more pain and suffering damages, whereas victim's age has a negative impact on the awards each plaintiff receives. 2 In our first-round data, courts award reimbursement of funeral expenses in 35% of the observations, and compensation for living expenses in 34% of the observations. 3 Article 194 of Taiwan Civil Code. 4 Although Article 20 of China's Tort Law of 2009 only lays down a very general principle regarding pain and suffering damages, the Supreme People's Court, in one influential 2001 "judicial interpretation," created rights of actions for survivors of the wrongfully killed victim. We are informed that court practices in China vary. In the Shanghai area, for example, courts award a flat pain and suffering damages, while in the Beijing area, a pain-and-suffering-damages cap was set but judges have discretion to determine the specific amount of such damages. 5 Article 711 of Japan Civil Code. In Japan, the pain and suffering damages in wrongful death actions are determined by formulas and are highly predictable. See Chapter 2 of Ramseyer (2014 forthcoming). 6 Article 752 of South Korea Civil Code. 7 I was told that in Japan in practice, the amount of pain and suffering damages in wrongful death cases is assessed according to a well-received tabular schedule. Thus, to a large extent, Japanese courts do not face the quantification problem that challenges judges in Taiwan.
Second, most cases have multiple plaintiffs and thus we can examine the patterns of judicial behaviors at both the "individual level" and the "case level." Individual level in this article means the pain and suffering damages requested by and awarded to each individual plaintiff. Analysis at this level is particularly helpful in examining whether familial relations with the victim affect the amount of pain and suffering damages. We find that spouses tend to receive more pain and suffering damages than parents and children; minor children come next; followed by parents; and adult children tend to receive the least. Case level in this article refers to the total pain and suffering damages requested by and awarded to all plaintiffs in one case. Examination at this level is useful in sorting out whether courts would reduce the amount of pain and suffering awards than they otherwise would when the defendant might go bankrupt due to the heavy compensation duty. Indeed, we find that when the amount of pecuniary damages paid by the defendants personally divided by defendants' income is positive, it has a negative, statistically significant effect in both the case level and the individual level. This result, along with the signs and statistical significances of other variables, suggests that judges tend to keep the (total) amount of compensation in check, so as not to bankrupt the defendants.
Third, our data include the amount of pain and suffering damages requested by the plaintiff. This allows us to assess whether, holding constant the exogenous influences on pain and suffering damages, the amount the plaintiff requests is associated with the amount the judge awards. If the requested amount independently influences the awarded amount, that is evidence that anchoring is at work. Since the defendant almost never supplied the court with a pain and suffering damages amount, the expected direction of the anchoring effect is reasonably clear. As the plaintiffs' requests for pain and suffering damages increased, anchoring theory would forecast that the judge awarded more in such damages. In Chang et al. (2014) , we have found evidence for such an anchoring effect. In this study, we again find that plaintiff's request, holding constant other variables, has a statistically significant effect on the pain and suffering awards.
Part II of this article describes Taiwan's law relating to pain and suffering damages. Part III addresses our hypotheses and methodology. Part IV reports and discusses our results. Part V concludes.
II. TAIWAN'S PAIN AND SUFFERING DAMAGES LAW
Pursuant to Articles 192 8 and 194 9 of the Taiwan Civil Code, close relatives of 8 Article 192 of Taiwan Civil Code stipulates that "(I) [a] person who has wrongfully caused the death of another shall also be bound to make compensation for the injury to any person incurring the medical expenses, increasing the need in living, or incurring the funeral expenses. (II) If the deceased was statutorily bound to furnish maintenance to a third party, the tortfeasor shall also make compensation to such third party for any injury arising therefrom. (III) The provision of the second paragraph of Article 193 shall apply to the compensation of the preceding paragraph." 9 Article 194 of Taiwan Civil Code stipulates that "[i]n case of death caused by a wrongful act, the the wrongfully killed victims can claim for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages. More specifically, the medical expenses incurred before death and the funeral expenses (within a reasonable range) can be reimbursed. Children of the victim who are less than 20 years old and parents and spouse of the victim who cannot financially sustain themselves can demand payment of living expenses. The father, mother, spouse, sons and daughters (in-laws not included) of the victim can claim for pain and suffering compensation for loss of consortium.
After injury and before death, victims suffer from pain. Their claim for pain and suffering can be inherited only if the defendant has agreed to pay for it, or if the victim has sued the defendant before he dies. In both cases, the compensation obligation may affect courts' decision on the pain and suffering damages we study here. Nonetheless, we had found that this stipulation has been rarely used in practice, and we have no evidence of its use in the cases we sampled; thus, we ignore this stipulation in the following regression models.
No formula exists for courts to determine the amount of pain and suffering damages. The civil code provides no guidance and no conventional wisdom or rules of thumb exist for quantifying pain and suffering. The plaintiff generally simply claims an amount, contending that it is just, with little supporting evidence. The court decisions usually start with a template discussion (stating that the socioeconomic status, total asset, annual income, age, educational background, etc. of both sides, the plaintiff's level of pain and harm, the plaintiff's negligence, the defendant's repentance, and so on have to be taken into account), 10 then summarizes the facts of the case at hand, and at the end awards an amount. Judges likely consider all facets of the case holistically, perhaps take a quick look at the decisions by their colleagues, and then follow their gut feelings. It is doubtful to what extent the factors listed in the template arguments match the key elements in a judge's heuristic decision-making process. 11
Plaintiffs do not have an incentive to claim unrealistically high amounts of pain and suffering damages. First, the court fee is proportionate to the amount of claimed total damages (roughly, around 1% of the total claimed damages). 12 Second, father, mother, sons, daughters and spouse of the deceased may claim for a reasonable compensation in money even if such injury is not a purely pecuniary loss." 10 Not all courts use the same template. The factors that a court explicitly claims to take into account slightly differ. The factors are taken from a few influential Supreme Court precedents on pain and suffering damages. The Supreme Court, however, only addresses the factors that should be considered, but not in what ways and by how much these factors affect pain and suffering damages. 11 The judgments often lack concrete information regarding, for example, education level. Thus, we are not able to put these factors in the regression models, not even putting them to chi-square test, to examine whether they influence judicial decisions. 12 Pursuant to Article 77-13 of Civil Procedure Code of Taiwan, the court fee is assessed in the following way: "NTD 1,000 on the first NTD 100,000 of the price or claim's value, and an additional amount shall be taxed for each NTD 10,000 thereafter in accordance with the following rates: NTD 100 on the portion between NTD 100,001 and NTD 1,000,000 inclusive; NTD 90 on the portion between NTD 1,000,001 and NTD 10,000,000 inclusive; NTD 80 on the portion between NTD the losing party has to pay the court fee. In a tort lawsuit, usually the plaintiff has to pay part of the court fee if the court does not grant all her claims. The plaintiff generally has to pay [1-(court award/plaintiff's claim)] × court fee. So claiming a high amount of pain and suffering damages increases both the court fee and the probability of bearing the cost of a higher percentage of the court fee.
Taiwan can generally be considered as a civil-law country. Almost all judges are career judges who may or may not have practiced law before serving on the bench. Most jurists in Taiwan major in law as an undergraduate, whereas a minority of jurists are trained in a JD-like graduate program. Jurists who pass the bar exam and finish six months of practical training are qualified to practice law. Jurists who pursue a career as judges or prosecutors have to take the "court officer" examination. Those who pass the examination will receive training in the court officer institutes for two years. At the end of their training, based on their grades, preferences, and openings, they will become judges or prosecutors. Judges are tenured, and thus presumably less influenced by external political influences. For civil matters, there are three levels of courts: district courts, appellate courts, and the supreme court. The former two can determine both questions of fact and questions of law, while the supreme court only deals with questions of law. Appealing to the appellate court is as of right, whereas large-stake cases represented by attorneys can be appealed to the supreme court, subject to its discretion (Eisenberg and Huang 2012; Chen, Huang, and Lin 2014) .
III. HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY
In Section A, we lay out our three main hypotheses regarding judges' behavioral pattern in setting pain and suffering damages. In Section B, the pertinent data are described and summarized. In Section C, we spell out the single-equation and structural-equation models at the individual and case levels.
A. Research Questions
Our core research question is to identify the major determinants of courtadjudicated pain and suffering damages for loss of consortium. The hypotheses are as follows: First, the individual-level pain and suffering award will vary by familial relations. Who are generally the saddest person beside the death bed? Perhaps the parents. A Chinese saying "the white-haired mourns the passing of the black-haired" describes this scenario, and cited by virtually all cases with parent plaintiffs we read. Perhaps the significant other. Perhaps the children who lose a broad shoulder and a 10,000,001 and NTD 100,000,000 inclusive; NTD 70 on the portion between NTD 100,000,001 and NTD 1,000,000,000 inclusive; and NTD 60 on the portion over NTD 1,000,000,000. A fraction of NTD 10,000 shall be rounded up to NTD 10,000 for purposes of taxing court costs." role model. We will examine how career judges in Taiwan rank the level of pain and suffering among close relatives.
Secondly, we hypothesize that judges will keep the amount of pain and suffering damages within a certain limit, so as not to push the defendant into bankruptcy. One critical difference between pain and suffering damages in personal injury cases and those in wrongful death cases is that in the former there is only one claimant for one tortious action (that is, the injured party herself), whereas there could be several claimants in the latter (mean and median around 4 plaintiffs; Table  1 ). The mean or median pain and suffering damages are not small amounts (mean and median around $33,000; Table 1 ). If the victim is survived by her parents, spouse, and four children, and the judge simply multiply the median pain and suffering damages by 7-along with pecuniary damages to dependent children, parents, and/or parents-the heavy liability could easily bankrupt a middle-class defendant. Bankrupting a defendant is undesirable because she could then rather running away and paying nothing. Also, bankruptcy may destroy another (defendant's) family. Note that we use "bankruptcy" in a loose sense here. In law, one person is either bankrupt or not (yet) bankrupt. In this article, we use bankruptcy to mean "putting heavy financial burden on the defendant." In the specific context of Taiwan, rarely do corporations or natural persons file for bankruptcy. Also, judges are unlikely to know with some certainty whether their decisions would lead to the defendants' formal bankruptcy filing. We choose to use the term bankruptcy because it is much shorter and easier to express. While judges are unlikely to self-impose a compensation cap, we conjecture that the bankruptcy concern will affect judges' decisions at both the case and the individual levels. Specifically, at the case level, the amount of pecuniary damages personally paid by the defendant divided by defendants' annual income would be negatively correlated with the amount of pain and suffering damages; the existence of corporate defendants and the number of natural-person defendants would be positively correlated with the amount of pain and suffering damages. At the individual level, the amount of pain and suffering damages each plaintiff receives decrease with the number of plaintiffs and with the amount of pecuniary damages personally paid by the defendant. In addition, the amount of individual-level pain and suffering damages would increase with the existence of corporate defendants, and the number of natural-person defendants.
Finally, judges, in determining a number absent guidance, are likely to be subject to the anchoring effect (Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich 2000; Wistrich, Guthrie, and Rachlinski 2005; Rachlinski, Guthrie, and Wistrich 2006; Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich 2007; Rachlinski, Guthrie, and Wistrich 2007; Rachlinski et al. 2009 ). 13 That is, another number, even an arbitrary or irrelevant one, might influence the amount of pain and suffering damages. In a tort lawsuit that leads to awards of pain and suffering damages, several salient numbers may exist. We hypothesize that a plaintiff's claim (ad damnum) may influence her awards, and the total request by all the plaintiffs in a case may influence the total judicial awards.
B. The Data
Using carefully chosen keywords, we limited the cases yielded by our search to ones the plaintiff won. We limit our search to the district court cases rendered between January 1, 2008, and December 31, 2012. 14 The research period was chosen to be consistent with our previous pain and suffering article . We focus on decisions by the court of first instance. As emphasized by Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich (2007: 4) and Eisenberg and Heise (2013) , most cases are handled by them; many of these decisions are final in that they are not appealed; 15 and such cases avoid the selection issues that arise in studying appellate cases, such as the parties' decisions to appeal and settlement of cases pending appeal.
Wrongful death can be caused by car accident, medical malpractice, assault, etc. We focus on car accident cases here because there are plenty of such cases, 16 and the background facts are all similar (a person negligently hits and kills a stranger). 17 Two rounds of sampling were conducted. In the first round, to assure geographic representation of the whole country, we stratified the sample by judicial district to obtain 10% of car accident cases from each jurisdiction. After filtering out irrelevant cases, we get 54 cases that are coded into 171 observations (one plaintiff, one observation). We decided to conduct a second-round coding because the number of first-round observations is small, and the data lack information on certain critical variables, such as victim's age and the annual income of the plaintiffs and defendants. We added a few more search terms to ensure that income and age are more likely to be observable from the judgments. This results in 183 cases (599 observations), all of which are coded. In the analysis that follows, we use the data set compiled in the second round, to gain internal validity. The data set compiled in the first round is used in an independent set of regressions as robustness check, to make sure that our findings are externally valid.
The individual-level pain and suffering damages awarded by courts in Taiwan exhibit somewhat bell-shaped distributions (after a log transformation) in all five familial relations, as Figure 1 shows. 18 The case-level pain and suffering damages also exhibit bell-shape distributions, centering on $100,000 (see Figure 2 ). The 14 Small-claim and simple-proceeding cases are excluded because the judgments in these cases usually do not contain enough information about the cases. 15 In the case of Taiwan, between 1996 and 2006, 60% of the torts cases were not appealed (Huang 2009: 196) . 16 By contrast, there were only 17 medical-malpractice wrongful death cases during the same period. 17 In assault cases, for example, the tortfeasors' motivations vary and may affect judges' decision. 18 Throughout this paper, the conversion rate is US Dollars: Taiwan Dollars=1:30. skewed distribution supporting the log transformation is typical of unbounded award outcomes. Figure 3 and unreported statistics demonstrate that 52% (99%) of the individual-level pain and suffering damages are in multiples of 500,000 (50,000) Taiwan Dollars. The most common amounts were 500,000; 1,000,000; and 1,500,000 Taiwan Dollars. This preference for round number in noneconomic damages is consistent with Hans and Reyna (2011: 133-137 )'s gist-based model of juries. Table 1 20.0 † In these zero-defendant observations, the tortfeasors have died at the accident and only their employers were sued.
C. Regression Models
Our empirical strategy is first, in sub-section 1, using single-equation models to identify important objective factors that affect judges' pain and suffering awards in the individual level, putting aside the potential effect from plaintiffs' ad damnum. In sub-section 2, structural-equation models are utilized to account for plaintiffs' requests and examine whether the anchoring effect exists. As there are more than one plaintiff in most cases, and judges are likely to make award decisions by taking into consideration the total amount of pain-and-suffering damages, in sub-section 3, we describe single-equation and structural-equation models that use judges' caselevel pain and suffering damages as the dependent variable and the summation of all plaintiffs' requests as one independent variable. As mentioned above, the data used and reported in this section are the round-two data. Round-one data are used in simplified version of the regression models as robustness check, but the regression results will not be fully reproduced. Only inconsistent findings will be noted and discussed in footnotes.
One Equation Models at the Individual Level
We use regression models that account for stratifying the sample by court district and the nonindependence of observations in cases with more than one plaintiff. The dependent variable is the natural log of the judge's pain and suffering damages award. The independent variables considered for inclusion control for defendant's payment of pecuniary damages, characteristics of both parties and victims, and familial relations between the plaintiff and the victim. Year and court fixed effects are also included. The models take the following form:
PS= α+ βPEC + θCH + ηFA + ρYR + ΩCT+ ε where PS is the log of pain and suffering damages (CPI-index adjusted); PEC are the variables representing defendants' payment of pecuniary damages (CPI-index adjusted) in natural log form, divided by defendants' annual income in natural log form; CH are several variables capturing the characteristics of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the victim; FA are four dummy variables indicating five types of familial relations; YR and CT are dummy variables indicating the years and jurisdictions of the case, respectively. The coefficients to be estimated are α, β, θ, η, ρ, and Ω; ε is an error term.
More specifically, PEC includes three variables that are intuitive but needs some calculation work. The simplest one is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the defendant's personal payment of pecuniary damages is positive, and 0 if otherwise. The other two variables are defendants' personal payment of pecuniary damages (in log) divided by defendants' annual income (in log)-hereinafter, damages-income ratio. These two damages-income ratios measure the relative financial burden caused by pecuniary compensation (hardly adjustable by courts) on defendants. Two continuous variables are needed because defendants' out-of-pocket payment of pecuniary damages can be positive or negative. One variable captures the positive amount, whereas the other variable captures the absolute value of the negative amount.
Defendant's personal payment of pecuniary damages is calculated in the following way: the amount of damages the defendant(s) still owes all the plaintiffs (as stipulated in the holding) + the amount of damages the defendant(s) has paid the plaintiffs prior to the verdict -the amount of adjudicated pain and suffering damages * (1-plaintiff's ratio of comparative negligence). 19 The idea behind this variable is that judges are likely to determine the amount of the more objective, relatively standardized pecuniary damages first, 20 and then embark on considering the more discretionary pain and suffering damages. And when doing the latter task, judges would take into account the probability of defendant's bankruptcy. The higher the positive damages-income ratio, the more likely that the defendant would go bankrupt. Thus, we hypothesize that the damages-income ratio, when positive, will be negatively correlated with the pain and suffering damages; when negative, will also be negatively correlated with the pain and suffering damages-note that the variable used in the models takes the absolute value of the payment, so the variable that captures the negative damages-income ratio is expected to have a positive coefficient.
Defendant's payment of pecuniary damages could be negative (it is indeed negative in 424 observations), due to the compulsory automobile liability insurance (CALI) in Taiwan. 21 Plaintiffs usually have received (or at least know the amount of) the CALI payment before litigation starts. Under Taiwan law, 22 the amount of CALI payment 23 to the victim's successors has to be deducted from the court-adjudicated pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages. Thus, if defendant's personal payment of pecuniary damages is negative (say, minus 1 million dollars), the first 1 million dollars in the court-adjudicated pain and suffering damages are considered already paid for by the insurance fund. The defendant does not have to actually pay from her own pocket. This should tend to increase the amount of pain and suffering damages, as there is less bankruptcy concern. Also, courts might concern that the negligent tortfeasors' walking away without paying anything weakens the deterrent effect of tort law. By contrast, any positive amount suggests that every penny of the courtadjudicated pain and suffering damages have to be paid by the defendant personally. This should tend to decrease the amount of pain and suffering damages, due to the bankruptcy concern. Because of the potential opposite effect of defendant's payment of pecuniary damages, we use two continuous variables to capture the effect.
CH includes a variable on victim's age; 24 the natural log of the number of plaintiffs; the natural log of plaintiff's income and defendant's income (both CPIindex adjusted); 25 dummy variables for whether the plaintiff and the defendant are represented by attorneys; a continuous variable representing the proportion of the plaintiff's comparative negligence (in our dataset, from 0 to 0.8) ; a dummy variable on whether the defendants include one or more corporations; and a variable that measures the number of "financial units" among non-corporate defendants.
The last two variables warrant more explanations. In our database, the corporate defendants are employers of the defendant(s) and are vicariously liable 21 For more information, see the official website of CALI: http://www.cali.org.tw/. 22 Commercial, private insurance payments, by contrast, need not be deducted from the damages. In only one case we sampled, the plaintiff voluntarily deducts the private insurance payment from the damages. We thus do not take into account private insurance payments (the amount of which is unknown anyway) in the models. 23 The amount of CALI increased over the years. As for March 2013 the maximum amount is 2 million Taiwan Dollars, or $67,000. 24 We have tried also adding the square of age as another independent variable, but it is insignificant. 25 In all observations with available information, courts acquire income information from the Ministry of Finance.
for the tort. We conjecture that courts would increase the amount of pain and suffering damages if there is a corporate defendant, because corporations are considered deep-pocketed. The financial unit variable is used to more accurately measure whether courts worry about bankrupting defendants. Other things being equal, the more defendants there are to share the burden of paying damages, the less likely that one or all of them will be bankrupt. Nevertheless, the number of defendants as listed in the judgments is not the most exact measure of defendant's financial wherewithal. For example, in all three-defendant observations in our dataset, the defendants are a minor tortfeasor and his parents (who are vicariously liable). They can only be counted as one financial unit, as adding a non-earning minor and a house spouse as defendants does not make the sole bread earner less likely to go bankrupt. 26 Hence, we carefully examine the relationships among the defendants and count the number of financial units (Table 1) .
YR is a series of dummy variables (one for each year) that controls the timing of the judgment. CT are a series of court dummy variables that control for the variance among jurisdictions. We combine 20 courts into 12, as a few courts have only a handful of observations, and use 11 dummies to control for regional variation. The combinations are based on geographic proximity and similarity in economic development.
We report 3 models. Model 1 is the baseline model, with damages-income ratios as the major independent variables of interest. Model 2 is a robustness check, using payment of pecuniary damages (without dividing by defendants' income) as the independent variables of interests and using defendants' income as a separate variable. In Models 1 and 2, only observations with positive plaintiff's income and positive defendants' income are included. The latter condition is necessary for Model 1, since defendants' income is the denominator. We are hesitant to assign infinity or an arbitrary number to the damages-income ratio in observations where defendants' income is zero. Observations in which plaintiffs have zero income are excluded because we found, in exploratory analysis, that the models for pain and suffering awards and requests for the plaintiffs with zero and positive incomes are substantively different. Model 3 is a variant on Model 2, but discards age, plaintiff's income, and defendant's income, all of which have many missing values, in order to use all observations in the regression models. This is also a robustness check on whether variable coefficients and signs change significantly if observations with missing values are added.
Structural Equation Models at the Individual Level
Our data include the amount plaintiffs requested in pain and suffering damages. Such information has not been available in prior pain and suffering studies, except in our previous article ) and Diamond et al. (2011) , which observes 19 such cases. We do not include it in the above single-equation regression models due to endogeneity. The requested amount is not independent of other explanatory variables such as plaintiffs' income. But the requested amount is of obvious interest and potential importance. It might be expected to influence the awarded amount in two ways. First, higher requested amounts put higher numbers before the judge. Anchoring theory suggests that higher requested numbers will be associated with higher awarded numbers independently of the merits of an increased award. Second, higher requested amounts may be associated with factors that should increase awards but that are not represented by observable variables. The plaintiff (or her attorney), in formulating the requested amount, may have access to information about the degree or nature of pain and suffering that we cannot observe-for critical reflection of this line of argument, see Part IV.C. To account for the more complex relationship among the variables in models that include the plaintiffs' request, we employ a structural-equation model. Note that we cannot meaningfully model the defendant's recommendation concerning pain and suffering damages due to its variety and lack of explicit amounts (see Table 2 ).
The two equations (both based on Model 1 in Table 3 ) use almost identical variables expect the following: the dummy variable on whether the plaintiff hires lawyers is not included in the award equation. 27 The plaintiff's request equation does not include defendant's annual income, of which the plaintiff most likely is uninformed when making her request. The plaintiff also cannot know the amount of pecuniary damages awarded by judges. Nevertheless, the plaintiff knows the amount of CALI payment, as well as the amount of payment from the defendant before the verdict (in fact it is generally paid before the lawsuit starts, usually used by the defendant to signal his sincere apology). We include these two amounts in the plaintiff's request equation. Finally, as plaintiffs do not know whether defendants will hire lawyers when making their petitions, the dummy variable on whether defendants hire lawyers is not included in the request equation.
We report two structural-equation models. In both models, only observations in which the incomes of the defendants are larger than zero are included, as defendants' incomes are the denominator in damages-income ratio. In the first model (equations 1 and 2 in Table 5 ), observations in which the incomes of the plaintiffs are larger than zero are included, for the same reason specified in the previous sub-section. In the second model (equations 3 and 4 in Table 5 ), we keep the 189 observations with zero-income plaintiffs, and add an additional dummy variable (which equals 1 if the plaintiff's annual income is zero, and 0 otherwise). 28 
Regression Models at the Case Level
Most cases in our dataset have multiple plaintiffs eligible for pain and suffering awards. The single-equation and structural-equation models described above address individual-level judicial decisions. To ascertain whether the judges are subject to the anchoring effect or whether the judges are concerned about bankrupting defendants, it is also necessary to examine case-level decisions.
A majority of independent variables in the aforementioned regression models are already case-invariant information, such as whether attorneys are hired. In the two sets of regression models that examine case-level decisions, sum of pain and suffering damages awarded to all plaintiffs in the case and sum of all plaintiffs' requests of pain and suffering damages are the dependent variable and the major independent variable of interest, respectively. Familial relations are individual-level variables. We do not use a series of dummy variables that represent different combinations familial members in case-level regressions, to preserve degree of freedom.
Due to the limited number of case-level observation, we use parsimonious models in both the single-equation and structural-equation models. The singleequation model keeps the three variables regarding payment of pecuniary damages, three variables regarding the number and income 29 of plaintiffs, two variables on defendants' financial condition, whether lawyers are hired, the percentage of the victim's negligence, and year fixed effects. The court award equation in the structural-equation model is basically the same as the single-equation model, except that the year fixed effects are not used, and that the percentage of victim's negligence is removed but still placed in the request equation, as we will find in the structural-equation models in the individual level that this percentage is only significant in the request equation. The request equation is also a simplified version of that in the structural-equation model in the individual level. 29 If a case contains multiple plaintiffs and the income of some of them is missing, we treat it as zero in summing the total annual income on the plaintiff's side.
IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

A. Differences Among Relatives
As compared to other familial relations, spouses receive the highest pain and suffering damages. Cursory reading of Figure 4 , Figure 1 , and Panel A of Table 1 leaves the impression that parents, especially dependent parents, receive more pain and suffering damages than spouses, as the mean and median amounts of the pain and suffering damages in these two groups greatly divide. Nevertheless, this does not suggest that when spouses and parents both claim in the same case, judges award more damages to the latter group. Careful observations of the data reveal that parents receive large pain and suffering damages when they are the only familial group that makes the request (victims often around 20 years old). Leaving aside cases in which only one familial group is listed as plaintiffs, and comparing the pain and suffering damages received by different familial groups case by case, we find that, in terms of the pain and suffering damages received in a given case, the following inequality generally holds: spouse>=minor child>=parents>=adult child. That is, for example, courts in Taiwan rarely give spouses less pain and suffering damages than other relatives of the victim, and minor children of the victim almost always receive pain and suffering compensation more than or equal to adult children or parents. For more detailed comparisons, see Table 4 .
Regression results as reported in Table 3 30 bear out the finding that spouses receive the most pain and suffering damages. In all single-equation, individual-level models reported in Table 3 , all familial relation dummies have negative signs and most of them are statistically significant. As spouse is the baseline category, the regression clearly shows that as compared to other familial groups, spouses receive more pain and suffering damages. We further test whether the differences between the coefficients of the four dummy variables are statistically significant, but none of them is. 30 We run Model (3) on round-one data for robustness check. Coefficients of all but one major variables have the same sign, though some of them become statistically insignificant, perhaps for lack of degree of freedom (N=168). Defendant's financial unit has a negative sign and is highly statistically significant (p<0.001). This result is counter-intuitive. In round-one data, this variable equals 1 in 167 of the 171 observations, and equals 2 in the other 4 observations. The lack of variance casts doubt on the reliability of the estimate of this variable. (164) victim's dependent parent (28) victim's adult child (275) victim's minor child (46) spouse (86) (1, 4, 0) (3, 0, 0) (5, 12, 1) Adult child
(1, 1, 0) (1, 13, 9) Dependent parent ( 0 , 1 , 0 ) Note: 1 represents one case (not one observation). For example, (5, 10, 0) in the upper-left cell in the table means that in 5 cases, spouse receives more than minor child; in 10 cases, the pain and suffering damages are the same; and in 0 case, the spouse receives less than the minor child.
B. Bankruptcy Concern
We find evidence for the claim that courts concern about bankrupting the defendants. We mainly rely on results from structural-equation models in the individual level and in the case level 31 (reported in Table 5 32 and Table 7 ), but we also take reference at the results from single-equation models in the individual level and in the case level 33 (reported in Table 3 and Table 6 ), as robustness check. All (properly specified) models show that when the damages-income ratio is positive, the variables capturing it have negative coefficients, and it has statistically significant (at least at the 0.05 level) impact on the pain and suffering damages awarded to individual plaintiffs as well as the total pain and suffering damages given to all plaintiffs. When the damages-income ratios are negative, the relevant variables in all models have positive coefficients, as expected, and all but one are statistically significant (at least at the 0.01 level) in the structural-equation model in the individual level. 34 We run the model using the absolute value of the amount; therefore, a positive coefficient means that more deduction of CALI payment from the pain and suffering damages tends to lead to higher amounts of court-adjudicated pain and suffering damages. 31 It is not feasible to run a properly specified, structural equation models in either level on round-one data. 32 The sample size used in structural-equation models reported in Table 5 is not very large, so we ran 500 bootstrap versions of these models to assess the impact of the lower sample size. The results are consistent with the structural-equation models; thus, the low sample size should not be problematic. 33 We cannot run the same single-equation, case-level models on round-one data, as there are so many missing values for plaintiffs' income and defendants' income. Another model, using defendants' payment of pecuniary damages (without divided by defendants' income) as the major independent variables, and not using any income variable, demonstrates similar results, though independent variables of interest are not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. N=54. 34 The single-equation model in the individual level also reveals a positive and statistically significant effect of a negative out-of-pocket payment. But note that the payment there is not divided by defendant's income. Figure 5 corroborates for the regression results. Note, however, that the left plot in Figure 5 shows that if defendants are all natural persons, the result-lower damages-income ratios leading to lower pain and suffering damages-is the opposite of what we expect. To further test the phenomenon, we add an interaction term (a continuous variable on negative damages-income ratio * a dummy variable on whether defendants include corporations) to unreported single-equation and structural-equation models, with all observations or with observations with negative out-of-pocket payment. The interaction term has the expected, opposite signs, 35 but is never close to statistical significance. Also, the absolute value of the coefficient for the interaction term is small as compared to that for the continuous variable on negative damages-income ratio. Hence, the opposite marginal effect of negative damages-income ratios on pain and suffering damages in observations with only natural-person defendants mostly disappear after we controls for other factors included in the regression models. Our general story still holds.
Notably, the structural-equation models in the case level and the individual level provide indirect supporting evidence for the bankruptcy hypothesis. In the plaintiff's request equations (Equations (2) and (4) in Table 5 and Equation (2) in Table 7 ), the dummy variable on corporate defendant and the continuous variable on the number of financial unit on the defendant's side are statistically significant at the 0.01 level (with one exception) and have positive signs. In other words, plaintiffs demand higher pain and suffering damages when defendants are likely to have deeper or more pockets. Moreover, the variable on the number of plaintiff in Models (2) and (4) in Table 5 has a negative coefficient (see also Figure 6 ) and is statistically significant at the 0.001 level, again consistent with our theory, as the plaintiffs may expect that courts will not just multiply a fixed amount of pain and suffering damages by the number of plaintiff, 36 and the plaintiff does not have an incentive to bankrupt the defendant, for fear of receiving nothing from the latter. Interestingly, none of the aforementioned variables is statistically significant in the judicial award equations. In addition, the variable on plaintiff's request in the judicial award equations is always positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, both in the individual level and case level (Equations (1) and (3) in Table 5 and Equation (1) in Table 7 ).These findings suggest that the judicial award is based on the plaintiff's evaluation. Put differently, whether defendants are corporate and the number of the two parties influence court-adjudicated pain and suffering awards through plaintiffs' requests, and judges do not give different weights to these factors. 37
35 When natural-person defendants are sued with (without) corporations, the slope in Figure 5 is negative (positive). Thus, we expect that the variable on negative damages-income ratios and the interaction term will have opposite signs. 36 The variable on the number of plaintiff in Models (2) and (4) in Table 7 has a positive coefficient, but this is not surprising. In the case level, the total amount of demanded pain and suffering damages tends to increase with the number of plaintiffs in the case. 37 We conjecture, counter-factually, that had plaintiffs failed to pay attention to the probability of bankrupting defendants (that is, whether defendants are corporate and the number of the two parties are not statistically significant in the request equations), the relevant variables in the award 
C. Anchoring Effect
At least two reasons suggest that the plaintiff's pain and suffering damages request should be relevant to the judge's pain and suffering award. First, judges will not award more than plaintiff's request. The request therefore caps the pain and suffering award and should be nonrandomly associated with it. Second, plaintiffs have an incentive to make reasonable pain and suffering requests because the court fee increases as the requested amount increases.
As discussed above, we adopt a structural-equation approach in which the structural equation includes the plaintiff's requested pain and suffering amount and an additional equation models the plaintiff's requested amount as a function of objectively observable factors. Our model is recursive and therefore is identified. The variables on plaintiffs' requests are statistically significant at least at the 0.05 level, and have positive coefficients. This is consistent with our prior empirical work ) and others' experimental work (e.g. Chapman and Bornstein 1996; Diamond, Saks, and Landsman 1998: 318-19; Hastie, Schkade, and Payne 1999) that find evidence for the anchoring effect of plaintiffs' ad damnum-but compare Diamond et al. (2011: 172-74) .
One may contend that the statistical significance of the request variable should at least partly be attributed to the private information of the plaintiffs that is either not disclosed to the courts or not chronicled in the judgments, based on which we code the information of the cases. While this reservation might be true in many other contexts, we doubt that there is important hidden information in this context. Surely a plaintiff knows better how sorrow she is, and perhaps how more painful she feel than other plaintiffs do. But courts are not asked to ascertain the level of pain, but to give monetary awards as damages. Plaintiffs do not necessarily have a comparative advantage over judges in comparing sorrow across cases. More importantly, there is no objective criterion in converting sorrow to money (Diamond et al. 2011: 153) . Thus, courts have no way to ascertain whether plaintiffs' requests are "grounded" (in their level of sorrow) or exaggerated. In this sense, plaintiffs' requests are entirely based on private information. As long as the ad damnum is observed, there is no (unrevealed) private information. Presented with the ad damnum, courts have two (prototypical) options: first, use it only as a cap, but otherwise ignore it; instead, courts use other factors in the cases to come up with their assessments. Second, take it wholesale. In reality, of course, courts follow the middle ground. Judges appear to follow the "anchor and adjust" procedure (Tversky and Kahneman 1974: 1128) , but do not adjust the required amount to approach a reasonable amount (as no such thing exists); rather, judges adjust to avoid bankrupting defendants. In sum, this article provides evidence that in determining the amount of pain and suffering damages, courts are greatly influenced by plaintiffs' requests and the out-of-pocket pecuniary damages.
D. Other Variables of Interests
Several other variables included in our models also reveal interesting patterns of judicial decisions. First, victim's age has a negative effect, and is statistically significant in most models. Second, in individual-level structural-equation models, percentage of victim's negligence has a positive effect on plaintiff's requested amount and is highly statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This is understandable. Victim's negligence percentage will become an across-the-board discount factor. Plaintiffs thus would be tempted to request more damages to cover the expected discount. Third, the incomes of individual plaintiffs or all plaintiffs have positive effects (see Figure 7) . These variables in the structural-equation models in the individual level are statistically significant at the 0.05 level, suggesting that plaintiffs with positive income demand a higher amount of pain and suffering damages when they have more earning capacity. Finally, whether plaintiffs or defendants hire attorneys have no effect. 38 The role of apology worth more treatment. Our intuition is that if the defendant offers his or her apology to the surviving relatives before the litigation, it would reduce the change of plaintiff's resorting to the court, and when the plaintiffs do, reducing the requested amount of compensation. We have no information on whether the defendant is apologetic, and we do not know how many accidents settle out of court. We do know the amount of defendants' pre-litigation payment to the plaintiff. This voluntary payment could be considered as a form of apology. Nevertheless, regression results reported in Table 5 show that the amount of such payment has a positive and statistically significant effect on the amount of pain and suffering damage requested by the plaintiff. Robbennolt (2008: 379-80) finds that plaintiff's attorneys would tend to increase claimed amount of compensation when the defendant offers her apology, whereas other experiments have found that apologies tend to decrease layperson plaintiffs' estimate of fair settlement value. The plaintiffs in our data behaved like the former, upping the ante when receiving a form of apology before litigation. To tease out whether pre-payment as an apology affects plaintiffs with attorneys and those without differently, we add an interaction term (dummy on plaintiffs hiring attorneys X the amount of pre-payment) to the two structural-equation models reported in Table 5 . Unreported tables show that the pre-payment variable and the interaction term both are statistically insignificant (both have positive signs). The lack of statistical significant may be due to lack of degree of freedom and collinearity. This issue is worth exploring further in future studies. Figure 7 Plaintiff's income versus plaintiff's requested (individual-level) pain and suffering damages Note: N＝267. "c" represent children; "p" represents parents; and "s" represents spouses. Each letter is one observation. The amounts of requested pain and suffering damages and plaintiffs' income are CPI-adjusted and in US Dollars before transformed into log10. Taiwan court cases decided from 2008 through 2012. Jittering is used to facilitate viewing similar data points. In 189 observations, the plaintiff's income equals 0; in 4 observations, the plaintiff's annual income is less than 1,000 Taiwan Dollars ($33 US). These observations are omitted here.
V. CONCLUSION
We show that in determining pain and suffering damages in car accident cases, not bankrupting defendants is the major concern for both plaintiffs and courts. Plaintiffs' requests have strong influences on court awards, suggesting that the anchoring effect is at work. In the individual level, when different familial groups appear as plaintiffs in one case, courts tend to award spouses the most pain and suffering damages. Spouses are followed by minor children, parents, and adult children.
The as-expected courts behaviors, consistent results, respectable R-square and other test statistics suggest the basic rationality of pain and suffering damages in wrongful death cases in Taiwan. Our empirical findings should reduce concerns expressed based on the substantial portion of damages consisting of pain and suffering damages in the U.S. (Viscusi 1988) . And this is a generally relieving story to other East Asian countries that allow pain and suffering damages for loss of consortium.
